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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

t

DAVID ERNEST MONTOYA,

*

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900319-CA

Priority No.

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted rape,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4102 and 76-5-402 (1990), in the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Weber County, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor,
presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court commit "plain error" in failing to
appoint alienists to examine defendant prior to sentencing?

To

satisfy the "plain error" test, the alleged error must have been
"plain," that is, from examination of the record it should be
obvious that the court was committing error, and the error must
have affected the substantial rights of the defendant, that is,
the error must have been harmful.

State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d

29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).

Was trial counsel ineffective?

Failure to cite to the

record in support of allegations and reference to matters outside
of the record render this Court unable to address substantively
defendant's argument.

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986);

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986).
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing
to dismiss a juror for cause.

"A motion to dismiss a prospective

juror for cause is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.11

State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

(citing State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
All applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are incorporated in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated
sexual assault, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Cods
Ann. § 76-5-405 (1990) (R.l).

After a jury trial, defendant was

convicted of attempted rape, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102 and 76-5-402 (1990) (R. 105). On
December 15, 1988, defendant was sentenced to a term of one to 15
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 94).
Defendant initially did not file a timely appeal.
However, apparently pursuant to State stipulation, defendant was
resentenced so that he could timely appeal (see R. 96, 99).
Defendant was resentenced on May 14, 1990 and timely filed a
notice of appeal on June 13, 1990 (R. 124, 120).
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts surrounding the underlying offense in this
case are not in dispute.

Defendant's claims of error involve

issues arising from the trial itself.

Therefore, only those

facts pertinent to the issues raised on appeal will be recounted.
Defendant challenged one juror, Carma Jensen, for cause
(R. 192). Ms. Jensen was a clerk in the circuit court in the
criminal division and was acquainted with both attorneys (R. 152,
193).

She was "closely related with" a Montoya family but did

not know defendant, although she had heard his name before in her
office (R. 152, 193). She stated that she did not think that
what she had heard or knew would have any influence on her (R.
152-3).

She also stated that she would not feel uncomfortable

ruling against either attorney (R. 193). The trial court denied
defendant's challenge (R. 194).
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defendant
requested that a presentence report be prepared and that a
psychological examination be ordered.

In that regard, the

following discussion ensued:
MR. POORMAN [defense counsel]: Your honor,
it's my client's desire to request a presentence report in this matter. . . .
We would also request of the Court a court
order with regards to a psychological
examination of Mr. Montoya while he stays attending the pre-sentence report. . . .
. . .

THE COURT: All right.

So ordered.

. . .

MS. GARNER [Adult Parole and Probation];
-3-

Are

you going to use alienists or are you going
to use —
THE COURT: I think probably that might be
preferable.
MS. GARNER: Can they get it done? I mean,
can they see him? What—I think, if I may
express myself, he needs or wants treatment
or at least to be seen by someone right now.
He's really concerned about his—about his
well-being.
THE COURT: Well, rather than doing it on a
formal basis and to appoint an alienist, why
don't we just refer the matter to Weber
County Mental Health and let's have someone
from Mental Health come over and visit with
him.
MR. POORMAN:

That will be fine, your honor.

THE COURT: Why don't we do this. Let's
contact Steve Watson and just explain that
they're not—they're not only concerned about
the sentence, but the defendant apparently is
having some problems. So we'll have Mr.
Watson or someone from his office come over
and speak to him.
(R. 419-20).
Defendant was seen 12 days later by Steve Watson, who
wrote that defendant had a "clear stream of thought.

[He]

[m]akes some suggestion of hallucination but genuineness is
questionable.

Wants sleeping or nerve pills.

If continues in

jail here, evaluate further in one week" (R. 93) (a copy of the
assessment is attached hereto in the addendum).
Defendant was sentenced to a term of one to 15 years at
the Utah State Prison (R.94).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not commit "plain error" in failing
-4-

to order that defendant be examined by alienists prior to
sentencing.

Defendant has not demonstrated that there is a

reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have been different
had he been examined by alienists.

Likewise, defendant has not

shown that, based on examination of the record, the trial court
obviously erred.
Defendant has based his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel on allegations supported solely by references to
matters outside of the record and has not cited to anything in
the record in support of his claim.

Consequently, this Court

cannot review substantively his claim.
The trial court acted within its discretion in refusing
to dismiss a juror for cause.

It properly applied rule 18(e),

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in assessing whether the juror
should be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT "PLAIN ERROR"
IN FAILING TO APPOINT ALIENISTS TO EXAMINE
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO SENTENCING.
Defendant requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's failure to appoint an alienist and remand for a new trial
(Br. of Appellant at 21 J.1

He argues that the trial court

1

Defendant also suggests that the trial court failed to
determine defendant's competency to proceed with trial (See Br.
of Appellant at 13, 21). Nothing in the record supports the
allegation that defendant, at any time prior to, during or after
trial sought to have himself declared incompetent. Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1990), "a person is incompetent to
proceed if he is suffering from a mental disease or defect
-5-

committed "plain error" in failing to order that he be examined
by two or more alienists prior to sentencing, in accordance with
the mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-2 (1990).
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two-part test
to determine whether a trial court has committed plain error.
First, the error must be "plain;" that is, from examination of
the record it should be obvious that the court was committing
error.

Second, the error must have affected the substantial

rights of the defendant; that is, the error must have been
harmful.

Thus, an error requires reversal if confidence in the

outcome of a trial is eroded and that, absent the error, there is
a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been
different.

State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert,

denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).2
resulting either: (1) In his inability to comprehend the nature
of the proceedings against him or the punishment specified for
the offense charged; or (2) In his inability to assist his
counsel in his defense." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3
(1990), "[w]henever a person who is charged with a public
offense, or who is serving a sentence of imprisonment, is or
becomes incompetent. . ., a petition may be filed in the district
court of the county where the charge is pending or where the
person is confined." Defendant has not filed such a petition in
the district court, either through trial counsel or appellate
counsel. Accordingly, any argument concerning competency should
be rejected as inapplicable to this appeal.
2

Eldredqe's "plain error" analysis was predicated upon
rule 103 (d), Utah Rules of Evidence, which governs rulings on
the admissibility of evidence ("Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.").
However, the Utah Supreme Court, although still relying on rule
103(d), has expanded the "plain error" doctrine to embrace errors
not based on evidentiary rulings. See State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d
819, 821 (Utah 1989) (where "plain error" analysis was applied in
the context of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct).
-6-

In the instant case, defendant's allegation of error
does not go to the trial itself but only to the sentencing.
Therefore, when assessing the second prong of the "plain error"
test, this Court is limited to determining whether, absent the
trial court's failure to appoint alienists, there is a reasonable
likelihood that defendant's sentence would have been different.
Defendant has neither alleged nor provided any argument or
evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that his sentence
would have been different had alienists been appointed.

Instead,

he has requested this Court to reverse the trial court's failure
to appoint an alienist and remand for a new trial.

That relief

is not appropriate within the context of his allegation of error.
Therefore, his claim should be rejected.
Defendant has likewise failed to meet the requirements
of the obviousness prong of the "plain error" test.

The statute

on which he bases his argument, Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-1 (1990),
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whenever a person is convicted of or pleads
guilty to rape . . . or an attempt to commit
[rape]. . ., and when it appears to the court
either upon its own observation or upon
evidence otherwise presented, that the
defendant may be suffering from any form of
mental disease or defect which may have
substantially contributed to the commission
of the offense, the court shall order a
mental examination of that person.3
Therefore, arguably, the doctrine could be applied to defendant's
allegation in the instant case.
3

The requirement that alienists under Utah Code Ann. § 7716-2 (1990) is not triggered unless the requirements of section
77-16-1 are satisfied.
-7-

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this section as
imposing "a mandatory obligation" on a trial judge to order a
mental examination if there is evidence of such a "mental disease
or defect".4

State v. DePlontv, 749 P.2d 621, 625 (Utah 1987).

In the instant case no evidence appears in the record that would
have mandated a mental examination.
In support of his claim to the contrary, defendant
states that he requested a psychological examination,5 that the
trial judge "recognized that it would 'preferred' [sic] to
appoint an alienist," and that a note from Weber County Mental
Health stated that defendant claimed to be suffering from
hallucinations, but that the genuineness of the claim was
questionable (Br. of Appellant at 12, 13). 6 A request for a

4

At the time of defendant's trial, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2305(4) (1990) defined mental illness, as follows: "'mental
illness' means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may
be a congenital condition or one the result of an injury or a
residual effect of a physical or mental disease. Mental illness
does not mean a personality or character disorder or abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct." The statute was
amended, effective March 13, 1990, resulting in an expanded
definition.
5

Defendant states that he requested psychological testing
both prior to and after trial. However, nothing in the record
supports his assertion that a request was made prior to trial,
and that allegation should be ignored. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d
296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to matters outside the record
are inappropriate, irrelevant and will not be considered).
6

Defendant also argues that a presentence report indicated
a prior history of ongoing mental illness, and he has addended a
copy of the alleged report to his brief (Br. of Appellant at 13).
However, that report is not part of the appellate record, and its
authenticity cannot be verified. Therefore, it should not be
considered by this Court.
-8-

psychological examination alone cannot be considered evidence of
mental illness.

Cf. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah

1989) (where the Utah Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of
competency to stand trial, relied on the principle that "[a]n
uncorroborated assertion of mental illness at trial was not
sufficient to require a competency hearing").

Similarly, the

judge's comment is not evidence of mental illness.

It does point

to the judge's awareness of the issue of defendant's mental
condition, but the judge only stated that he thought that such an
appointment "probably . . . might be preferable" (R. 419-20).
Instead, after further consideration, he ordered an assessment by
Weber County Mental Health.

The results of that assessment were

neutral, at best.
The transcript of defendant's trial likewise offers no
obvious evidence that defendant was suffering from a mental
disease or defect that may have substantially contributed to the
commission of his offense.

Defendant testified at length and

coherently about the events of the evening of the attempted rape
and his contact with the victim (R. 368-92).

Although his

testimony contrasted sharply with the victim's testimony, nothing
in it suggests mental disease or defect.

Defendant has not met

his burden of showing that it is obvious, from examination of the
record, that the trial court committed plain error in not
ordering a mental examination of defendant by appointed alienists
prior to sentencing pursuant to sections 77-16-1 and -2.
Eldredge, 772 P.2d at 35.
-9-

Defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of the
"plain error" test and has failed to request an appropriate
remedy.

His argument, therefore, should be rejected.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO CITE TO THE RECORD AND
HIS REFERENCES TO MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE
RECORD RENDER THIS COURT UNABLE TO ADDRESS
THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL.
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

because he did not make a reasonable inquiry into his mental
health.

In support of that argument he makes numerous

allegations concerning his contact with his trial attorney prior
to trial concerning his mental state and to events allegedly
occurring more than two years after his conviction.

Defendant

has not cited to the record in support of his allegations.7
Moreover, all of the allegations of deficiencies refer to matters
outside of the record.
by this Court.

Therefore, they should not be considered

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986)

("[D]efendant has failed to refer to pages in the record in
support of his point on appeal.

These deficiencies will normally

require us to assume regularity in the proceedings below and
correctness in the judgment appealed from." (citations omitted));
Cook, 714 P.2d at 297 (references to matters outside of the
record are inappropriate, irrelevant and will not be considered).

7

Defendant does cite to the record one time. He notes
that trial counsel did request a psychological evaluation (Br. of
Appellant at 15). That citation supports trial counsel's
competency.
-10-

In the absence of any record support for defendant's
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court
cannot enter into a substantive analysis under the test
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d
401 (Utah 1986).8

Therefore, defendant's claim should be

rejected.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO DISMISS A JUROR FOR CAUSE.
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in refusing to dismiss a juror for
cause.

The juror in question, Carma Jensen, was a circuit court

clerk (R. 152). She knew both attorneys, was related to a
Montoya family, and she did not know defendant but had heard his
8

Interpreting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
(1984), the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant has the burden to
demonstrate that counsel's representation falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness. . . . Defendant must
prove that specific, identified acts or omissions fall
outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.
. . .

Furthermore, any deficiency must be prejudicial to
defendant. It is not enough to claim that the alleged
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome or could
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact finders. To be
found sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively
show that a "reasonable probability" exists that, but for
counsel's error, the result would have been different. We
have defined "reasonable probability" as that sufficient to
undermine the confidence in the reliability of the verdict.
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. See also State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893
(Utah 1989).
-11-

name (R. 152, 193). She stated that she did not know enough
about the case to be concerned about being neutral and that she
would not feel uncomfortable ruling against either of the
attorneys (jrd.).
"A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."

State v.

Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v.
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989)).

An appellate court

M

'will presume that the discretion of the trial court was

properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary.'"

JEd. (quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-

35 (Utah 1984)).

An appellant has the burden of establishing

that reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion.9
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906 (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439f
448)).

In determining whether a trial court has abused its

discretion, "[d]ue consideration should be given to the trial
judge's somewhat advantaged position in determining which persons
would be fair and impartial jurors. . . ."

Salt Lake City v.

Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) (quoting Jenkins
v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981)).

This Court has

observed, however, that the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a

9

In articulating the defendant's burden in alleging error
as a result of a denial of a challenge for cause, it appears that
the appellate courts will also employ a harmless error analysis.
Even if a defendant shows that the trial court abused its
discretion, he or she must then show that, absent the error,
there was a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
more favorable to the defendant. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d
1221, 1230 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).
-12-

trial court's discretion in selecting a jury must be viewed "'in
light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any
problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and
selecting another.'"

State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah

Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536).10
Because it is the trial court's duty to see that a defendant's
constitutional right to an impartial jury is safeguarded, it must
fully investigate a juror's potential bias.

Woollev, 810 P.2d at

442.
The Utah Supreme Court has given the following guidance
to courts in assessing a potential juror's ability to act
impartially:
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be
supposed to yield to the testimony that may
be offered; which may leave the mind open to
a fair consideration of that testimony,
constitute no sufficient objection to a
juror; but that those strong and deep
impressions which will close the mind against
the testimony that may be offered in
opposition to them; which will combat that
testimony and resist its force, do constitute
a sufficient objection to him.
State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989) (quoting
Revnolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878)). If comments
by a potential juror facially bring into question that juror's
10

In citing Jenkins v. Parrish, this Court noted that that
decision appeared to apply a "some deference,f as opposed to a
"sound discretion" standard of review. In so noting, the Court
stated that, regardless of the standard of review, a judge's
discretion must be viewed in light of this factor. Woollev, 810
P.2d at 442 n.3. However, this Court has not suggested what
weight should given to that factor. In light of the more recent
"sound discretion" mandate of Gotschall, it appears that it
should not be the determinative factor.
-13-

partiality or prejudice, the trial court or counsel must
investigate further and find the inference rebutted or dismiss
the juror.

State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906 (citing State v.

Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Utah 1989)).

See also State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451.
Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
identifies the grounds on which a challenge for cause of a
potential juror may be taken.

The rule states, in pertinent

part, the following grounds:
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship
between a prospective juror and any party,
witness or person alleged to have been
victimized or injured by the defendant, which
relationship when viewed objectively, would
suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be
free of favoritism. A prospective juror
shall not be disqualified solely because he
is indebted to or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof;

(14) that a state of mind exists on the part
of the juror with reference to the cause, or
to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging . . . .
Defendant relies on subsection (14) and State v.
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), to support his allegation of
error.

However, Brooks interprets the meaning of "actual bias,"

as defined under section 77-30-18(2), as a right to challenge a
prospective juror.

However, section 77-30-18(2) was repealed in

1980, and the sections governing challenges for cause were
-14-

radically changed.
exists.

No section equivalent to 77-30-18(2) now

Therefore, the precedential value of that case at the

present time is questionable.
Moreover, theftrookscourt specifically addressed the
I
situation of when a prospective juror "through a personal
association with a witness or party has developed a relationship
of affection, respect, or esteem [for that person and therefore]
cannot be deemed disinterested, indifferent, impartial."
802.

Jd. at

In the instant case, there is no evidence of such an

association.11

Ms. Jensen knew both attorneys but stated that

she would not feel uncomfortable in ruling against either (R.
193).

She did not know defendant (R. 152). Although Ms. Jensen

was familiar with defendant's name, nothing in the record
suggests that she could not be neutral.

The trial court

specifically asked whether her knowledge of defendant and the
case would affect her ability to be neutral.

She responded, "No.

No. " (R. 193). Nothing she said even facially raised the
question of partiality or prejudice.

See State v. Jonas, 793

P.2d at 906. Moreover, rule 18(e)(4) states that "[a]
prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because [s]he
is . . . employed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof."
11

Defendant makes numerous allegations and draws
inferences concerning Ms. Jensen's associations with the judge,
the trial attorneys and defendant (Br. of Appellant at 18-20).
Defendant fails to cite to the record in support of the
allegations and inferences and cannot do so because the record
does not support them. Therefore, this Court should disregard
the allegations. Olmos, 712 P.2d at 287.
-15-

Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his challenge for
cause or that abuse resulted in reversible error.

Jonas, 793

P. 2d at 906. His claim should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
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